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Making difference: queer activism and anthropological 
theory 
 
Abstract 
This article examines two paradoxes. The first is ethnographic: queer activists in Bologna, Italy are 
concerned with defining themselves in opposition to fixed categories of identity and forms of politics 
based on them. In so doing however, they must engage with the risk that this endeavor of difference-
making itself becomes as fixed and uniform as the identities to which it is opposed. The second paradox is 
theoretical: a range of anthropologists have recently argued that the relationship between theoretical and 
ethnographic material should be one of identity or correspondence. Yet such arguments, though highly 
conceptually stimulating, often reproduce in form what they refute in content: abstraction and 
metaphysical speculation, thus re-inscribing the difference between our concepts and our data. This article 
simultaneously connects these respectively ethnographic and theoretical questions, whilst also 
deliberately holding them apart. The beginnings of an answer to both, it suggests, lie in an explicit 
attention to the boundaries and differences, rather than simply the isomorphisms, between theory and 
ethnography.   
 
Saying globalization is your theoretical interest is a little like an astronomer saying “my theory is 
Mars”. (Robbins 2014:70) 
 
Lines had been drawn, and though there was to be no battle, there was a tank. It was made of 
pink velour, and on it hung a sign reading “surrender to love”. There were also uniforms. Some 
of the uniforms did what uniforms usually do, and clearly designated their wearers as alike in 
some respect. There were police uniforms, blue with white holsters for their pistols, some 
firemen milling around in red polo shirts, and the white and red together of the emergency 
medical services. Wearers of these uniforms tended to remain on the periphery, or outside of 
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them altogether, waiting in case their services were required, whilst occasionally posing for 
photographs with those in another sort of uniform.  
This other sort of uniform was not, stricto sensu, a uniform, certainly not of the same sort as the 
first (at least, not usually). Rarely were any two instances the same, and on another day the idea 
of describing them as uniforms would seem strange. This, however, was 9th June 2012, the day 
on which the city of Bologna hosted Italy’s national Pride parade. The procession began early in 
the afternoon at Porta Saragozza, one of Bologna’s medieval gates, and snaked its way to Piazza 
Maggiore, the city’s main square. A large section of town had been pedestrianized to allow the 
parade to proceed unhindered by motor vehicles, and in many locations metal barriers divided 
the road and the pavements on which spectators stood or which, later, marchers used to 
circumvent the hold-ups that frequently occurred as a float was rearranged, or a musical display 
performed.   
Some of these second sorts of uniforms were made of leather, others were t-shirts with slogans in 
pink-framed speech bubbles printed on them. Still more were feathered headdresses or boas, 
rainbow-coloured hats or face paint, and bridal dresses. A friend wore a dressing gown, whilst 
another painted a moustache on her face. Some did not exist – that is, they consisted of a notable 
absence of clothing where one might normally expect it. But they were all uniform insofar as 
they marked their wearers out as belonging to the community of people celebrating that day. 
Each was different to another in some particular way. Yet all were different in a similar way 
from those who did not wear this sort of uniform.  
In the early stages of the procession the physical barriers the police had erected between the 
pavements and the road made it relatively easy to tell who was marching and who was not. Then, 
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later on, when the parade had become a carnival and a succession of celebrations, some of which 
would go on until the next day, a lot of those who had merely stopped to watch the parade as it 
passed had gone home. By that point almost everybody left standing was wearing a version of 
that second sort of uniform.   
For most of the day the physical lines and barriers between spectators and participants, queer and 
not queer, blurred and collapsed as the parade became a manifestation of the value of equality 
which its organizers sought to promote. The metal barriers seemed to disappear as the march 
reached further into the center of the city, and by the time it arrived in Piazza Maggiore it was a 
mass of people unbroken by physical divisions. But even so, even with the physical barriers 
missing, in the crowds of Piazza Maggiore, one could see another value the parade was intended 
to embody: difference. The very lack of uniformity of the uniforms on show, the cultivated 
difference from the everyday, made their wearers stand out, and stand out together, in contrast to 
those around them (for comparable examples see Dave 2011; Port 2012).  
Needless to say, it is impossible to draw a line, in any clear sense, around a community of queer 
activists in Bologna, even on the day of the year that they are most visible. But there are things 
that make them different from those who are not queer activists, and one of those things is the 
way in which they tend to think about difference as something that one has to make.  
 
And now for something completely different 
There seems to be a consensus, across a range of anthropological schools of thought, sometimes 
implicit but often – as in the primary example I treat in this article – explicit and well-theorised, 
about the fact that the best kind of anthropological analysis is that which is most difficult to 
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distinguish from ethnography. That what we might once have thought of as “anthropological 
theory” should not be considered different from ethnographic description, or perhaps from the 
theories of those whom we study. As Tim Ingold has recently noted, “it has become 
commonplace – at least over the last quarter of a century – for writers in our subject to treat the 
two [anthropology and ethnography] as virtually equivalent” (2008:69). Andreas Glaeser, writing 
in a recent volume intended to diagnose “a certain impasse in the theory ethnography relation 
today”  (Boyer, Faubion, and Marcus 2015:3), notes likewise that “seasoned practitioners of both 
ethnography and historiography have rejected explicit theorization as part of their accounts” 
(2015:83). 
Indeed, the range of questions to which it is claimed that answers should be found not through 
abstract reasoning, or what Faubion calls “model-theoretic apparatuses” (2011; 2015), but in 
ethnography has expanded to include methodological and epistemological ones, such as how 
anthropology should understand translation (Viveiros de Castro 2004), cultural change (Vilaça 
2015) use examples (Krøijer 2015), generate politico-economic concepts (Jiménez and 
Willerslev 2007),  and reinvigorate its notion of truth (Holbraad 2012), to name but a few. In 
fact, one of the few recent anthropological collections devoted specifically to epistemology is 
frequently concerned with claiming, as the argument of one of its contributors is described by the 
editors, that “anthropology has no need of any epistemology other than ethnography” (Toren and 
Pina-Cabral 2011:6). In this paper, I treat a question exemplary, indeed paradigmatic, of this 
methodological or epistemological type – namely, what relationship should exist between 
ethnography and theory in anthropology. I do so in order to show that there are instances in 
which questions of this form are better addressed by emphasizing the differences, not the 
resemblances, between theoretical concerns and ethnographic ones.  
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Ingold makes that remark about how easy it has become for us to equate ethnography with 
anthropology as part of an argument, subsequently repeated elsewhere (2014), for distinguishing 
between the two (2008; see also Cook 2016). Whilst that sounds rather similar on the surface to 
the suggestion I have just made – that sometimes it might be helpful to think of theory and 
ethnography as different – Ingold in fact identifies ethnography with “descriptive or 
documentary aims…which impose their own finalities on trajectories of learning, converting 
them into data-gathering exercises destined to yield “results,” usually in the form of research 
papers or monographs” (2014:390). Anthropology, on the other hand, is an “ontological 
commitment…to join in correspondence with those with whom we learn or among whom we 
study” (2014:390). Arguing against theorizing from the armchair, Ingold claims that its 
“paradox” “is that in order to know one can no longer be in the world of which one seeks 
knowledge. But anthropology’s solution, to ground knowing in being, in the world rather than 
the armchair, means that any study of human beings must also be a study with them” (2008:83 
italics in original). 
Ingold, in other words, far from suggesting that there might be a difference between description 
and analysis, is arguing the reverse: any anthropological endeavor, he suggests, if “it is to do 
justice to the implicate order of social life, can be neither descriptive nor theoretical in the 
specific senses constituted by their opposition. It must rather do away with the opposition itself” 
(2008:81).  
Ingold repeats this argument in a critique of Da Col and Graeber’s proposal for an “ethnographic 
theory”, despite the fact that “ethnographic theory” is also intended to stimulate 
“ethnographically grounded, theoretically innovative engagements with the broadest possible 
geographic and thematic range” (2011:viii), as its name suggests. They come at the problem of 
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theory in contemporary anthropology from the opposite direction to Ingold – disapproving of 
what they think of as the imposition of concepts from European philosophy onto ethnography, 
rather than of the cold, descriptive enterprise of data collection – but their solution is roughly the 
same: that ‘theory’ must be ‘ethnographic’i. 
One suspects, in turn, that perhaps at least one example of the imputed imposition of European 
philosophical concepts onto ethnographic data that Da Col and Graeber have in mind is 
anthropology’s recent “ontological turn”. This, as with Ingold’s criticism of their own argument, 
is despite the fact that the notion of “recursivity” on which much ontological turn argumentation 
is based, and which I will discuss further shortly, is explicitly premised on there existing a 
continuity between ethnographic data and anthropological concepts and on a critique of 
philosophical abstraction. So, for example, Henare et al argue in the introduction to Thinking 
through things that “instead of just adapting or elaborating theoretical perspectives…to 
reconfigure the parameters of “our” knowledge to suit informants’ representations of reality, [the 
ontological turn] opens the way for genuinely novel concepts to be produced out of the 
ethnographic encounter” (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007:8). 
We have then a series of recent and influential reflections on the problem of how our 
observations and descriptions and our arguments and analyses should relate to one another in 
which the response to that problem is not only identical, but is in fact identity, an identity 
between theory and ethnography. These arguments largely compete over who has best achieved 
this or whose method is most likely to do so, rather than about this principle itself. Of course, 
these reflections by no means exhaust current thinking on the relationship between theory and 
ethnography, but they represent a prominent and influential strain, and moreover one which is 
powerful enough to unite people who otherwise disagree with one another. Anthropological 
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projects aiming explicitly at generalisation, say, remain relatively rare (though see e.g. Faubion 
2011; Laidlaw 2014) and are usually not focussed on the methodological question of how such 
generalisation is possible (though see Candea Forthcoming)ii. Miyazaki has similarly noted a 
propensity for anthropologists to identify “the ethnographic condition in which there is no 
distance between anthropologists' analytical practices and those of their research subjects as a 
methodological opportunity” (2006:132), quoting Maurer’s argument that “the convergence or 
indeed isomorphism of anthropological tools and the knowledge-generating techniques of those 
they study opens possibilities for a new kind of ethnographic sensibility” (Maurer 2003:163; 
cited in Miyazaki 2006)iii.  
This article is an attempt to think differently about the question of how ethnography and theory 
relate, by explicitly thinking of them as different. At the same time, it offers a glimpse of a 
particular, but related, question faced by the queer activists I worked with during my first period 
of fieldwork in Italy. So, the article’s argument will partly be an instance of itself, in that by its 
conclusion I hope it will be clear that those two issues, first the question of how theory and 
ethnography relate, and second a question from my own ethnography, are themselves related, but 
at the same time very different. Hence its status – unlike arguments for recursivity – as only 
“partly” an instance of itself. Because rather than presume that the answer to the question of how 
theory and ethnography relate lies in ethnographic material, which would beg it rather than 
answer it, I will aim – for a substantial part of the argument – to hold apart those two facets as far 
as possible, as a methodological experiment.  
The article is structured into three fairly equal parts: first I discuss an ethnographic question that 
emerged from my fieldwork in Bologna with queer activists, one that revolves around an issue of 
central concern to this kind of activism, namely the notion of difference. This discussion is not 
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intended to be, or even to resemble, a comprehensive ethnographic account of queer activist 
perspectives on difference in Bologna. It is a partial description of a specific set of practices and 
problems involved in such activism, ones which throw into relief an equally specific set of 
anthropological problems. That is not an unusual strategy in anthropological writing, though 
some may prefer that it were. I make no attempt to defend such strategies, because it is precisely 
the question of how ethnographic material and anthropological problems relate that I aim to 
address. I have chosen to do so by demonstrating the consequences of self-consciously adopting 
the conceits of some forms of anthropological writing. My reasons for doing so will, I hope, be 
clear by the paper’s conclusion.   
After this I discuss an analytical question regarding what is an important feature of a range of 
current ideas about anthropology’s proper task in relation to ethnography. A longer and more 
ambitious piece might seek to make the argument that follows in such a way as to encompass 
other, similar but differently named features, such as “ethnographic theory” or Ingold’s 
“philosophy with the people in it” so as to establish firstly that they share something in common, 
and secondly that they all suffer from the problem I go on to identify. However, for reasons of 
space I will confine myself largely to discussing the notion of recursivity. I will do so because I 
think that term is one that has received a significant amount of theoretical elaboration, and is thus 
both a clear example of the form of argument I am describing, and also, in some ways for that 
very reason, of the problems with that form. The nature of that analytical question revolves not 
around difference – as in the ethnographic case – but around identity, in the sense of resemblance 
– namely the resemblance we are told should exist between anthropological concepts and 
ethnographic ones. The final part of this paper will discuss the relationship between the first two 
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parts – in other words, between the ethnographic and the analytical –and their differences and 
resemblances, over the notions of difference and resemblance. 
In essence, what I am going to suggest is that there is something fundamentally and perhaps 
unhelpfully self-contradictory about anthropologists having highly complex and abstract 
theoretical arguments over how un-theoretical they are. This is akin to what I have elsewhere 
seen described as the problem of Dumbo’s featheriv: Dumbo, the eponymous hero of a classic 
Disney film, is a baby elephant who can fly because of his very large ears. Dumbo, however, 
does not like having big ears, so he tells himself he can fly because he has a magic feather. 
Anthropological accounts often have big theoretical ears, but they would sometimes rather 
believe instead that they have a magical ethnographic feather.  
This is not an argument against “ethnography” – whether of the form Ingold disapproves of, or 
any other – but against what Matei Candea and I suggest calling “ethnographic 
foundationalism”: the notion that ethnographic engagement is the beginning and end of 
anthropological epistemology. There are lots of arguments we could better have – including ones 
about how ethnography and theory relate – if we were explicit about the difference between our 
own metaphysics and assumptions, and those which emerge from our ethnographic material. In 
order to make that difference clear in my own case (though the phrase ‘make that difference’ 
may already recall to the reader my opening vignette), I proceed to discuss my ethnographic 
material and this analytical question in as distinct a manner as possible. 
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The difference they make 
The city of Bologna in Italy is known by various sobriquets including la grassa, or the fat, for its 
food, la dotta, or the learned for its university, the oldest in Europe, and la rossa, or the red, for 
the color of much of its historic architecture and for its politics (on which see e.g. Kertzer 1974; 
Kertzer 1980; Però 2005). It was for its politics that I selected it as a fieldwork site. It was widely 
known as la vetrina, or the showcase of Italian Communism, as well as being a hotbed of extra-
parliamentary political action, particularly in the seventies, and because of that long association 
with the Italian left it has become a bastion of the queer activist community in Italy. It hosts the 
largest and oldest base of Italy’s most well-established gay and lesbian rights organization, 
Arcigay, as well as innumerable smaller groups based in social centers and occupied buildings.  
But perhaps not surprisingly, precisely because Bologna is where the movement is strongest, it is 
also where it is most internally differentiated, and a great many of those internal differences 
concern, precisely, the notion of difference itself. Indeed, the key point of the ethnographic 
tension I discuss here is to what extent and how it is possible for a group of people to be brought 
together around a concept as divisive, as it were, as difference. But that problem itself raises 
another one: precisely to the extent that it was difference, albeit of different kinds, that was an 
ubiquitous concern for the activists I worked with, it was also this concern for difference that 
gave them an identity, and thus to some extent made them the same, a point to which I will 
return.   
In fact, though, more often than not the answer to whether or not anything like a queer activist 
community actually exists in Bologna appeared to be no. What might look like a community to 
an outsider, I was often told, was in fact riven by deep ideological and political divisions, a 
 11 
number of which came very much to the fore during debates over Italy’s 2012 national Pride, 
which took place in Bologna. Lines of a sort had been drawn long before the barriers were put up 
at Pride itself. 
A few months before the parade was scheduled to take place, on a warm evening in Spring, I 
joined around thirty to forty people in a bar in the city’s northern district, one that was a regular 
haunt of some of the groups with whom I worked. The atmosphere was somewhat more tense 
than usual, with several small groups of people talking quietly at individual tables, rather than 
the loud and disorganized kind of socializing that usually preceded a meeting. 
Gradually, the space filled up with people and it became evident that a range of groups were to 
be represented at this meeting: occupying the stage as they waited to begin were the two speakers 
for the evening, Marina and Massimo, leading members of an occupied space (centro sociale) 
not far from where I lived, itself home to at least 3 different collectives. Some of the city’s most 
famous centri sociali were also represented at the meeting that night, alongside people from MIT 
(Movimento Identità Transessuale) Italy’s oldest transgender rights organization, as well as a 
plethora of smaller groups. Also present were members of two national organizations which aim 
to support young LGBTQ people in difficult domestic situations, along with their parents. 
Strikingly absent, however, were representatives of Arcigay, the largest and oldest LGBTQ 
organization in both Italy and Bologna, and the official organizer of the 2012 Pride. Much of 
Arcigay’s recent focus has been on lobbying for marriage rights and fertility rights. 
 
The event that night was organized by Marina and Massimo, the de facto leaders of a network of 
small groups which had come together – loosely speaking, as we will see - around an opposition 
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to Arcigay’s official Pride, so it was not a great surprise that the latter had chosen not to send 
anyone to what would likely not be a meeting friendly to their particular position. 
 
This first difference I describe within the community, between Arcigay and many of the smaller 
groups – temporarily coalesced into this network - that were often highly critical of it, was 
perhaps the most obvious of the differences I will discuss, and people’s position with respect to 
Arcigay was a relatively clear indicator of their relationships to other activists. This first 
difference also will not sound unfamiliar to many people acquainted with queer activist 
movements, or indeed familiar with the work of say Sarah Green, Naisargi Dave, or Cymene 
Howe who have all extremely eloquently described similar dynamics in movements in eighties 
London and contemporary India and Nicaragua (Dave 2012; Green 1997; Howe 2013; on 
“rights-based” vs queer politics cf. also Berlant and Warner 1998; Rahman and Jackson 1997). 
 
Arcigay’s Bologna chapter is its oldest and most established local incarnation, and is based in 
large grounds on the outskirts of the old city. It made, I was told, quite considerable amounts of 
money from its weekly disco, and it was often insinuated to me by those critical of it that its 
leadership was more interested in increasing this cash flow than it was in political activism. As 
far as such activism goes, Arcigay focused on lobbying for rights: adoption rights, rights to 
fertility treatment, anti-discrimination legislation, and, most of all, marriage rights. They had 
chosen to emphasize these issues in their organization of the Pride celebrations, casting it as a 
“family pride” to which grandmothers and infant children should feel as welcome as anyone else.  
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As the title of the event I attended that evening suggested – “the revolution is not a wedding 
breakfast” – Marina and Massimo and most of the members of their network did not agree with 
this choice of objectives. Indeed, they saw the institutions of marriage and the family as prime 
targets of the movement’s critique, not as objects of aspiration.  
 
So, by the time of the meeting I am describing Pride had already become a major battleground 
for a range of issues which had been on the boil for some little while. As an official from 
Arcigay explained to me, to her and her colleagues it seemed an obvious decision to hold Pride 
in Bologna, the heartland of the Italian gay and lesbian rights movement, and to focus it on 
issues that she felt everybody could agree upon. As far as those at the evening’s meeting were 
concerned though, holding Pride in a city that had (relatively) few serious problems in terms of 
discrimination made no sense. In fact, they suggested, it was probably just a consequence of 
Arcigay’s internal power struggles. 2012 happened also to be the 30th anniversary of the Bologna 
chapter of Arcigay’s foundation, and it was intimated that hosting Pride would improve their 
standing and prestige in comparison to rivals in Rome. Most of all though the choice of political 
focus was also anathema to the network. 
 
Though Arcigay place a degree of rhetorical emphasis on the valuation of difference, the tension 
at the heart of their politics that its critics were keen to highlight was that the differences Arcigay 
claimed to value were also differences it seemed to want to erase. Their activism was permeated 
by a desire, as Marina put it to me, “to be like everyone else. We want to get married like you, 
we want to have families like you”. It was what Massimo would often call a “politics of 
reaction”. As far as he and Marina were concerned, Arcigay sought to subsume virtuous 
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differences from the norms of Italian society back into it. They wanted to make difference 
disappear into heteronormative identity. 
 
Hence the purpose of the meeting that night. It would be about, as Massimo put it in his 
introduction, “real pride, a more original, authentic, and truer version of what pride should mean 
to people”, one that would display what he called “real difference”. That was a phrase that would 
be repeated throughout the night, as Massimo and Marina criticized what they called “the 
integrative movement” for its failures to appreciate this more genuine form of difference. 
“Radical, transgressive difference”, Massimo argued, was “the essence of Pride, queer difference 
that never stabilizes into fixed identities like gay, lesbian, or straight”.  
 
However, the tension Massimo was wont to identify in Arcigay’s normalizing activism, between 
the promotion and valuation of difference, and the apparent desire to subsume that difference 
into identity, was far from absent from his own activism, as others within his network were 
equally wont to point out. A number of members of the network privately echoed his own 
“politics of reaction” critique of Arcigay back at Massimo himself. He was so obsessed with the 
problem he saw in Arcigay’s reproduction of normative identities that all of his own activism 
became defined simply in opposition to Arcigay itself, they said, a problem related to the more 
structural ones I will discuss below. For example, Arcigay staged a mass kiss-in in Bologna’s 
main square on Valentine’s Day 2012, in advance of the Pride celebrations. Largely because of 
its tenuous association with pride and the fight for marriage rights, Massimo had been vocally 
opposed to the kiss-in as a form of protest, resulting in murmurings of dissent from other 
 15 
members of the network. What next, one person asked, are we going to start beating up gay 
people because Arcigay opposes homophobic violence? 
 
The issue of dissent within the network in general raises a more fundamental question in regard 
to difference, indeed in many ways the key ethnographic question of this paper. The network that 
composed the meeting I have been describing was deliberately structured in opposition to 
Arcigay. Where Arcigay had a formal leadership hierarchy, the network was a loosely defined 
association of like-minded groups that on the whole emphasised self-government based on 
consensus building, with no explicit hierarchy, the word network chosen deliberately to 
emphasize its flatness. And yet, as I have suggested, Marina and more especially Massimo were 
in all but name its leaders. They wrote its manifestos, organized and chaired its meetings, and in 
Massimo’s case dominated the discussions that took place at them. Massimo was a highly 
charismatic speaker and a member of the movement’s old guard, in his forties though he looked 
much younger.  
 
I have already described the atmosphere at the meeting that night as somewhat tense, and that 
was largely because a few days previously Massimo and Marina had presented a manifesto for 
the network that was intended to crystallize its position in opposition to pride. They had been 
somewhat taken aback though to discover that a number of members of the network felt that a 
document of that form ran completely against the spirit of the network itself. The network, 
according to this opposition and indeed to Massimo’s own articulated vision of it, was not 
supposed to have a single position. The whole point of forming the network was to insist on the 
virtue of performing difference from the fixed identities they saw Arcigay as representing – how 
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could they do that if they fixed their own identity in a manifesto, or behind the leadership of an 
individual?  
 
That, in essence, is the ethnographic tension with which I am concerned here. Arcigay chose 
Bologna as a site for the 2012 Pride and focused it on marriage rights in order to find something 
that would unite a movement riven with division and disagreement. Yet in doing so they caused 
yet more division and disagreement on the part of people like Massimo and his network who felt 
that this unity came at the cost of the promotion of that real, or radically transgressive difference 
he spoke of at the meeting. But at the same time, of course, as members of the network pointed 
out, Massimo himself was trying to fix the community in his own image: the very idea of real 
difference points paradoxically to a kind of essential identity to which he hoped the meeting’s 
attendees would subscribe. And in a replica of his own disagreement with Arcigay he found 
himself likewise accused of a politics of reaction by privileging his own particular and preferred 
form of real difference – that between himself and Arcigay – over all others.  
 
In a sense these disagreements are unsurprising: when “making difference” – in the literal sense 
of permanently enacting a difference that is understood to be ubiquitous – is what defines your 
identity, then it is unsurprisingly difficult to solidify that identity at any kind of communitarian 
level. But at the same time however, and as was made clear to me by the ways in which 
Massimo’s attempts to unite the network behind him foundered, the description I have just given 
is of course a paradox, because it already does solidify that identity: in suggesting that making 
difference from fixed identities is what defines the queer activist community in Bologna, I have 
slipped in to the very language of identity politics against which they define themselves.  
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Yet the members of the network present at the meeting I have described were at the same time 
united by something that made Massimo’s attempts to fix this unity in fact perfectly plausible. 
They and the queer activists I worked with all, broadly speaking, believed in the virtue and 
necessity of making difference. By this I mean that they believed in making their difference from 
the fixed identities they opposed as clear as possible, something that was much on show during 
the week of Pride itself, which was, as my opening vignette suggested, a festival of what 
Massimo would describe as real differences: drag queens and kings, leather, S&M gear, nudity, 
and the giant pink velour tank with a sign on it reading “surrender to love”. These are enactments 
of how queer activists think about difference – they literally make difference between oneself 
and others. Insofar as they differentiate activists from non-activists they also instantiate the 
tension I am describing: difference is both what makes them different from one another – 
because it is understood to be an ubiquitous construction – but also different from others (and 
therefore potentially the same) – because others do not think about difference this way. These 
made differences were thus both uniform in one sense, and paradigmatically not so in another: a 
‘repetition of differential sameness’, in Jarett Zigon’s terms (Zigon 2013:719).  
 
In other words, and put very simplistically, fixing the identity of a community through its shared 
belief in the necessity and virtue of performing difference from fixed identities is not an easy 
task. Yet it is exactly this shared belief that does indeed bring them together. 
 
And that is precisely the ethnographic tension I am seeking to draw out: Massimo, many 
members of Arcigay, and all those at the meeting who disagreed with one or both, do share a 
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common understanding of difference as something that it is both necessary and virtuous to make 
and it is precisely this common understanding that does allow them to emerge occasionally as a 
community, as was the case, in the end, in the Pride celebrations, for example. But, of course, 
insofar as there exists a solution to the problem of how to build a community around the idea of 
difference as something that has to be made, it creates a new problem: how to reconcile the 
existence of such a community with the central tenet that actually holds it together, namely that 
difference is produced and should be produced all the time. A belief in “making difference” as 
what makes them different from one another is also what makes them the same.    
 
This tension resembles – but also differs from – the tension in anthropology that emerges around 
the notion of “strategic essentialism”, first proposed by Gayatri Spivak as a way of accounting 
for the persistent power of identity in spite of its deconstruction (Spivak 1988). The term has 
since come in for a range of engagements and criticism, and it is not my intention to engage with 
it in great depth here. What I wish to point out though, is the presupposition of which it is by 
definition guilty: that the “essentialism” it describes is only “strategic”. When used in description 
it foregrounds, in other words, the concept of a fixed identity, but it does so only by tacitly 
assuming that such fixed identities are really only chimerae, an assumption that usually reappears 
in analysis (cf. (Sylvain 2014).  
 
I raise this issue not because I wish to suggest that a form of “strategic essentialism” is at work in 
the tension I have described amongst queer activists; quite the reverse, in fact. Whilst the idea of 
strategic essentialism foregrounds a notion of identity and simultaneously reasserts an underlying 
politics of difference, my account of queer activism in Bologna suggests that a politics of 
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difference is put in the foreground in order – at least occasionally – to fix a kind of identity. It is, 
as it were, a kind of “strategic anti-essentialism”. 
 
This is partly, of course, an artefact of my account, rather than its object. As Strathern notes in 
the case of her use of feminism in The Gender of the Gift,  
 
My account exploits perspectival devices, including the us/them dichotomy, as essential 
fictions to its argument. I even include “the feminist voice” as one perspective. But I 
hope I have not thereby homogenized it. For Owens (1985:62) notes that the "feminist 
voice is usually regarded as one among many, its insistence on difference as testimony to 
the pluralism of the times," thereby making it victim to assimilation as an 
undifferentiated category in itself. Its internal differences are suppressed in the adoption 
of “the feminist view”. (Strathern 1988:38) 
 
And later: 
 
Feminist scholarship, polyphonic out of political necessity, accommodates anthropology 
as “another voice”. Within this epistemology, anthropological analysis of male-female 
relations in non-Western societies in the end cannot explain Western experience, which is 
also personal experience, although it may contribute to the further experiences about 
which feminists must think. At the same time, different viewpoints are sustained in 
coeval parallel; indeed, the multiplicity of experience is retained as a sign of authenticity. 
Each is a feminist voice, but the voices create no single viewpoint, no single perspective, 
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and no part-whole relation between themselves. The only perspective lies in the common 
challenge of patriarchy. (Strathern 1988:39) 
 
What gives feminism, for Strathern, its distinctive identity – as opposed, importantly, to 
anthropology – in spite (indeed because) of its insistence on plurality is its unity vis-à-vis the 
condition of women in the world. Hence the unproblematic nature of its plurality, for there 
remains a “continuity of purpose” in its antagonistic relationship to patriarchy. Fixed identity, in 
my ethnographic case, is the equivalent of feminism’s patriarchy, the perspective queer activism 
cannot adopt and the difference it cannot produce. But without it – as in the case of feminism and 
patriarchy – this kind of activism makes no sense as activism. Of course activism of this form 
looks like an “undifferentiated category”, in Strathern’s terms, when put into relationship with 
what it opposes – “undifferentiated categories” themselves; but it is precisely in relation to what 
it opposes that it has meaning as activism. In part for that reason I am holding it stable within 
that comparative relationship, rather than elaborating further upon the nuances of internal 
differences over difference that exist within it.  
 
I will return to these questions, and the reasons for which I have chosen to depict this tension in 
this way, in the final part of this paper. For now, that, in a nutshell, is the ethnographic issue with 
which this paper is concerned. At this point, what I could do is to show how this ethnographic 
question speaks to broader conceptual issues in anthropology by linking it with analytical 
concerns that are in some very obvious sense connected to it, or at the very least I could strive to 
make that connection to my analytical concern as obvious as possible.  
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I am not going to do that however, as I indicated in my introduction, and so although the switch 
in registers – the difference I am about to make, if you will - may feel somewhat jarring, I hope 
by the conclusion of the argument it will be clear that that switch and that difference was 
deliberately made, might not have been made, and that an important part of the overall argument 
of this paper will be that such differences can and ought to be made at least on occasion. 
 
The difference we make 
The analytical problem I am concerned with in this second part of this paper is an extremely old 
one, and one that has been addressed by a number of what are now classic reflections on the 
subject, such as those of Radcliffe-Brown (1951), Evans-Pritchard (1950), Leach (1966), Geertz 
(1966), Herzfeld (1987), and Rabinow (1988) to name only a few prominent examples, although, 
as Boyer, Faubion, and Marcus note in a recent volume, there has been a “relative silence” on the 
issue for the last twenty-five years (2015:5). I make no claim to survey or account for the 
enormous range of responses to which this problem has given rise. The claim I will make is the 
traditional anthropological one: that my ethnography may speak in interesting ways to the most 
recent set of responses to this analytical problem, and in doing so go a little way towards 
complicating precisely the issue of how exactly ethnography does speak to analytical problems.  
 
Which, in fact, is exactly the analytical problem with which I will be concerned: how do 
ethnographic data and analytical concepts interact with one another? That problem, though an 
old one, has recently arisen anew in the form of what has been called a recursive turn in 
anthropological theory, and its associated ontological variations, but is also present to varying 
degrees in a range of contemporary methodological and theoretical reflections. As well as 
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Ingold’s call for a “philosophy with the people in it” and Da Col and Graeber’s notion of 
“ethnographic theory”, it is present for example in the methodological injunctions that have 
emerged from perspectivism, whether in the form of Viveiros de Castro’s notion of equivocation 
or in the idea of symmetrization that Philippe Descola has expounded on. One might also see it 
in the suspicion of theory, or anything else that intrudes on the immediacy of ethnographic 
presentation that is to be found in variants of Actor Network Theory, which aim to “follow the 
actors themselves” (Latour 2005:12).  
 
So, whilst I am going to confine myself largely to discussing this problem through the notion of 
recursivity that is because it is in and through this notion that the ideas I am describing have had 
an extremely sophisticated theoretical exposition (e.g. Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007; 
Holbraad 2012; Holbraad and Pedersen 2009), not because they are confined to those who prefer 
to use that particular language.      
 
The suggestion I am going to make – one which will, eventually, lead us back to the 
ethnographic question I have just discussed – is that contemporary ideas about the relationship 
between anthropology and ethnography centre not around difference but around identity, and in 
particular around one identity, namely that between concepts and things, between ontology and 
epistemology, or more broadly between conceptual analysis and ethnographic data. The key 
conceptual underpinning of these ideas is to collapse the distinction between concepts and 
objects, an argument that has of course been made from the edited volume Thinking through 
things (Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007) onward throughout the recursive turn’s 
development. It is also I think worth pointing out that although a number of different aspects of 
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this body of work have come in for recent criticism (Bessire and Bond 2014; Graeber 2015; 
Heywood 2012; Laidlaw and Heywood 2013; see also Pedersen 2012), its recursive component – 
its fundamental view of what work anthropological concepts do – has remained relatively 
unscathed.  
The obvious way in which to describe what is meant by recursivity is through an example, and 
the obvious example to choose is Holbraad’s monograph, Truth in Motion (2012). I will try to be 
as brief as possible, without doing too much of a disservice to an extremely elegant and 
sophisticated argument.  
The ethnographic problem Holbraad is faced with is the classic problem of alterity – how to 
account for something that our analytical categories appear unable to explain, in this case, the 
indubitability of Ifa divinatory truth in Cuba – the fact that its oracular verdicts are, according to 
its practitioners, not open to doubt.  
“Classic anthropology”, according to Holbraad, can only account for divinatory indubitability as 
an absurdity or an irrational belief (Holbraad 2009:82–84; 2012:51–53, 71). We have a few 
understandings of indubitable truth at our disposal from Anglo-American philosophy – analytical 
truths about bachelors being unmarried men, or Kripkean a posteriori truths about water being 
H2O, as Holbraad lays out (Holbraad 2012:71) – but none of these make sense of how a 
statement issuing from an oracle such as “you are bewitched” could possibly be considered 
indubitable, appearing as it does to be a simple case of representational truth – either you are 
bewitched, and the statement is true, or you are not, and the statement is false. 
So, the syllogism of the recursive solution Holbraad provides runs roughly as follows: 
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Since any representational truth must by definition be open to the possibility of doubt, it follows 
that divinatory truth is a non-representational truth, because it is indubitable. Since that 
ethnographic concept – a truth that has no representative relation to states of affairs in the world, 
and whose opposite is not falsehood – does not exist in our analytical repertoire, Holbraad must 
invent one, which he does in the form of “inventive definition” (Holbraad 2009:87; 2012:219), 
which is, therefore, both a description of divinatory verdicts and an instance of itself, or 
“metarecursive”, in Holbraad’s terms (2012:237).  
 
Inventive definitions are non-predicative truth statements. Like Roy Wagner’s notion of 
“invention” (1981), they derive their truth not from their possession of an external relationship to 
things in the world to which they can be applied but from the intensively transformative effects 
they have on the objects to which they relate. Thus, as in one of Holbraad’s examples, to say that 
“Wagner is a genius” is not to connect two pre-existing entities via an external relationship of 
meaning, but to transform both entities into something new (Holbraad 2012:44). In the same 
way, divinatory verdicts are precisely not open to doubt because they do not represent a state of 
affairs in the world but modify the objects to which they apply: “You are bewitched” “transforms 
me from a person who stands in no particular relation to witchcraft into a person who is being 
bewitched” (Holbraad 2009:88). Similarly, “inventive definition” itself puts together concepts 
like “speech act”, “inauguration”, “novelty” and “meaning”” in order to produce a new concept, 
that of “inventive definition” (Holbraad 2012:220).  
Anthropological concepts more generally are supposed to function in the same way: they emerge 
in relation to specific ethnographic data because of the “alter” nature of such data, their otherness 
(Holbraad and Pedersen 2009). Because we cannot explain the alterity of Cuban divination with 
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existing concepts of truth, we invent a new one which transforms old ones through its relation to 
the ethnography of Cuban divination. Thus “inventive definition” is not merely a case of 
Wagner’s concept of “invention” being “applied” to Cuban divination, but of a set of concepts – 
including, undoubtedly, “invention” – being put into relation with Cuban divinatory truth to 
produce a new concept, “inventive definition”, or which is thus a mix of both concept and datum 
together (Holbraad and Pedersen 2009; Holbraad 2017).   
Thus, in the language of this “postplural” vision (Holbraad and Pedersen 2009), anthropological 
concepts are not predicates attached or applied to data, they are intrinsically and intensively (in 
the Deleuzian terminology of the turn) linked to them. It is only by mistakenly “cutting off the 
ethnographic tail” of an anthropological concept that one could arrive anything that would 
resemble abstraction, or a difference between an anthropological concept and an ethnographic 
one (Holbraad 2017:154).  
The arguments upon which the recursive turn is based all proceed from this fundamental 
premise: that analytical concepts, rather than being abstract, are of the same order as 
ethnographic data. They collapse the distinction between analysis and ethnography to arrive at 
this new notion of the “anthropological concept”. 
 
That premise, however, is self-refuting, in so far as the “anthropological concept” asserts the 
mutual imbrication of concepts and objects, indeed denying the conceptual “purity” of concepts 
in anthropological theory per se; except, that is, for the “anthropological concept” itself, which 
emerges from a series of highly conceptual, abstract, and analytical ruminations that have 
nothing to do with ethnographyv; much like this section of my paper, and much like the 
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arguments of Ingold, Da Col and Graeber; much like most methodological and epistemological 
reflections on the status of method and epistemology in anthropology. 
 
In other words, there can be no non-conceptual source for this notion of the anthropological 
concept itself. Even claiming, in meta-recursive fashion, that as a concept it might resemble 
certain ethnographic objects as a justification is circular in the same way, because it either 
assumes in advance that concepts and objects can resemble one another in the very particular 
sense in which these authors intend it, or what is meant is simply that it resembles certain objects 
in the way that any concept resembles that which it is intended to conceptualize, i.e. in 
abstraction. Thus, arguments based on a recursive premise frequently produce in form (highly 
analytical discussions of abstract concepts like the “anthropological concept”) what they refute in 
content (the distinction between concepts and objects, analysis and data). The more rigorous and 
well-conceptualized these arguments are (as in the case of the recursive turn) the further they 
move from ethnography; the more systematized and comprehensive the claims, the more abstract 
the reasoning. 
 
To bring us back to the issue of identity with which I began this part of this paper, I am 
suggesting there is a tension intrinsic to recursive argumentation around the notion of identity: 
recursive anthropology and related trends argue that the distinctive thing about the 
anthropological concept is the identity it produces between things we took to be abstract 
concepts – like truth – and the things we took to be data – like Cuban divinatory practices. But 
precisely insofar as that idea is distinctive, it cannot itself be derived from any ethnographic data. 
In other words, the recursive claim that concepts and data are alike is exactly why its conceptual 
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analysis will always in fact be irreducibly different from its ethnography – because there is no 
ethnographic source for that claim itself.   
 
Or put another way, if the claim here is that what makes recursive anthropological analysis 
recursive is precisely its attempts to collapse the boundary between concepts and data then of 
course this results in the paradoxical assertion that what makes recursive conceptual analysis 
different from other things – like ethnographic data – is the exact extent to which it makes that 
difference disappear.  
 
To return to Strathern on feminism and anthropology, making difference disappear is exactly the 
reverse of what her account of that relationship accomplishes:  
 
Feminists argue with one another, in their many voices, because they also know 
themselves as an interest group. There is certainty about that context. The anthropologist 
is in a rather different position. There appears no such anthropological interest group. For 
anthropology, play with internal contexts – with the conventions of scholarship (genre) – 
looks like free play with the social context of anthropology as such (life). (Strathern et al. 
1987:268 italics in original) 
 
“Play with internal contexts” – such as blurring the boundaries between concepts and objects – 
“looks like free play”. But internal contexts are internal to something: blurring those boundaries 
reproduces them, because it is only anthropologists who do so, in order to answer peculiarly 
anthropological questions, such as “how do my concepts and my ethnographic objects relate?” 
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As Jean-Klein and Riles point out in making a similar argument with regard to anthropology and 
human rights, it is precisely Strathern’s point that these differences are actually what makes 
anthropology and feminism of use to one another, and so ought to be sustained. Or better yet, as 
Jean-Klein and Riles put it: “if at times it seems like there is no difference between 
anthropological practice and human rights practice, then perhaps difference, like relevance, must 
be produced, as an effect, not simply found in the world” (Jean-Klein and Riles 2005:188). 
“Producing” the difference between feminism and anthropology is exactly what Strathern’s 
account accomplishes. Producing, or making difference is also exactly what I have argued is a 
constitutive aspect of queer activism in Bologna.  
 
The difference this makes 
With that last sentence, I hope, what I have made to appear a deliberately unwarranted excursion 
into the realms of abstract anthropological analysis now begins to appear possibly, if still 
problematically (as I will discuss), connected to the ethnographic issue I raised in the first part of 
this paper.  
 
The analogy one might make would go as follows: first, I highlighted a tension intrinsic to queer 
activism in Bologna: this tension lay in the fact that it is constitutively concerned with making 
difference from fixed categories of identity. But in being thus united by such a concern, making 
difference can often appear to be its own kind of fixed identity, as clear and recognizable as 
those it opposes. Making difference in this way can thus also produce identity.  
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Second, what I have just sought to argue is that the tension in contemporary discussions of the 
relation between ethnography and theory in anthropology lies in the fact that they identify the 
distinctive nature of anthropological analysis with its ability to collapse the distinction between 
analytical concepts and ethnographic data. But insofar as this is argued to be anthropology’s 
distinctive nature it is thus also what will always make it different from other things, including 
the ethnography it seeks to identify with. So here making identity also makes difference.  
 
So, the two issues, one ethnographic and one analytical, are inversions of one another, connected 
but also disconnected, alike but also different.  
 
In the sense in which they are alike, the relationship between theory and ethnography in my own 
account is much like it should be according to Da Col and Graeber, Ingold and indeed the 
recursive turn. In that sense, my account has sought to use what one might think of as an 
ethnographic theory about difference and identity to shed light on a more analytical problem. 
However, the analytical problem in question has been whether or not “ethnographic theories” can 
deal with all kinds of analytical problems. And the light it has shed demonstrates, in fact, that no 
matter how much we may claim that our theory is only derived from our ethnography, a 
difference will always remain. And if this account is at least partly concerned with making that 
difference as explicit as possible, a part of the difficulty involving in doing that derives from the 
fact that the object from which it aims to differ is precisely the activist project of making 
difference explicit. 
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My argument, in other words, like the two problems it has addressed, is itself unstable - it has 
made both identity and difference. Hence, unlike the circularity of “ethnographic theory”, of 
which the ouroboros is a deliberate figuration (da Col and Graeber 2011:vi), or of recursive 
argument (see e.g. Holbraad 2009:218; though also Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell 2007:218), or 
Ingold’s ‘arcs’ of theory and ethnography which “embrace each other in an encompassing, 
brightly illuminated ellipse” (2014:393), the argument I have made here does not invite 
agreement on self-supporting grounds. It is not a closed circle (or ellipse). It both performs and 
refutes itself, just as its component parts do: queer activism performs the difference it seeks to 
make to the world, but in doing so risks becoming akin to that which it opposes. Recursive 
anthropology performs the identity it seeks to create between analysis and data, but in doing so 
distinguishes its analysis from that data. And the analogy I have made works – or does not – in 
the same way: it connects the two problems through their difference, over, precisely, connection 
and difference. 
 
That difference is why my account is not a simple case of using ethnographic material to resolve 
a theoretical problem. If it were, it too would reproduce in form what it refutes in content – it 
would use ethnography to argue against using ethnography to resolve theoretical questions. And, 
moreover it would miss the point of the ethnography in question, which was after all about 
making difference, not about making things the same.  
 
That is why I have deliberately emphasized the obvious differences, rather than similarities, 
between the ethnographic and the analytical problems I have dealt with (and what could be more 
different than queer activism and the ontological turn?). By describing them as separate 
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analytical and ethnographic concerns, by dividing this paper accordingly, and by beginning not 
with a general question to which I then tried to fit a case, but with a case to which I then 
deliberately and artificially connected a question. I have made, in other words, as much 
difference as possible between that question and my ethnography. I have tried to show, both in 
content and in form, that some of the conceptual questions we ask are not answerable through 
ethnography – and I think one of those questions is precisely the question of how our questions 
and ethnography relate. 
 
Earlier in the paper I used the neologism of “strategic anti-essentialism” to describe the emphasis 
queer activism in Bologna places on difference from fixed identity and the fact that it leaves the 
identity this emphasis itself produces implicit, whilst being careful to note that this perspective 
was in part a fiction of my account. Why I did so is I hope now clear: the identitarian product of 
the anti-identitarian politics of queer activism in Bologna is not a matter of choice but a 
necessary aspect of such activism itself. Queer activism – like feminism, as Strathern describes – 
may be internally perspectivalist, in the sense that it allows and indeed promotes a multiplicity of 
viewpoints within it, but its relationship to its object, identity, is prior to the terms related 
(Strathern 2011). As in the case of feminism and patriarchy, there is no choice of perspective 
when it comes to identity: to be a queer activist in Bologna is to have a specific kind of 
(oppositional) relationship to the category of identity. That is precisely why it is unhelpful – in 
terms of activism – to point out that from another perspective this may appear self-refuting: that 
“other perspective” is unavailable from an activist perspective.   
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Clearly it is not unhelpful in the same way to point out that anthropology need not always insist 
on there being an identity between its ethnographic and theoretical categories. I am of course by 
no means the first to suggest that difference, detachment, and separation may have as much value 
to some of the people we work with as the kind of non-dualist collapsing of boundaries that 
inspires Ingold, Graeber, and the recursive turn. But even though a number of authors have 
pointed to the ethnographic importance of dualisms and boundaries in a range of contexts 
(Candea 2010; Reed 2004; Stasch 2009; Yarrow et al. 2015), non-dualist thinking continues, 
paradoxically, to dominate explicit theoretical reflection on the question of how theory and 
ethnography should relate. That such reflection remains nevertheless highly theoretical is, some 
might say, evidence enough of its implicit confusion, but I have tried in this paper to think 
through it and with it, with the help of my ethnographic material. In doing so I hope to have 
shown the extent to which connection and difference are important to both. 
 
But if we only focus on connection, we risk becoming the mirror image of Massimo: so 
concerned with purity, although in our case a purity of resemblance rather than of difference, that 
we miss the difference we inevitably make. Instead, I suggest, we think about how to identify 
which questions are better addressed by emphasizing those differences, rather than resemblances, 
between the kinds of anthropological arguments we make and the ethnographic material with 
which we make them.vi One of those questions, I have suggested here, is precisely the question 
of just how similar and how different theory and ethnography are. 
 
What alternative consequences does this proposition entail? For a start, it would allow us to 
avoid what I have no doubt will justly be seen as the central problem of this paper: it would no 
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longer be necessary to address – even in the somewhat roundabout manner that I have done here 
– complex methodological questions through an engagement with ethnography of some form, 
and ethnography would no longer come combined with abstract ruminations about what it can 
tell us about anthropology as a discipline. 
 
As should be obvious from the content of the latter part of this paper, I consider such 
methodological issues to be deeply important, and I think simply ignoring or dismissing them is 
not a sustainable position. But my point here is that we can only gain in our ability to answer 
them by recognizing the fairly self-evident truth that they are not of the same kind as 
ethnographic ones. A large portion of the later part of this paper has been an attempt to show that 
this difference exists. That difference should be clear to any reader whose reaction is to wonder 
why I have not discussed the connections between queer activism and political economy, say, 
and/or made further comparative remarks on similar cases in anthropological literature, and/or 
discussed the place of the Catholic Church in contemporary Italian politics, and/or simply been 
more “ethnographic”. We know, on some level, how to tell when something is “ethnographic” 
enough: one suspects we might have more trouble specifying when something is “ethnographic-
theoretical”, or “recursive” enough.   
 
These latter sorts of questions are also, obviously, important, and the first part of the paper raised 
an example of them (and see Heywood 2015a; Heywood 2015b; Heywood 2015c) despite the 
diversions of its final part. Would such questions be better addressed in the absence of diversions 
into methodological issues? Undoubtedly, and that is exactly the point I have just been making. 
 34 
But it is a point – a difference – that needs to be made, not taken for granted, particularly when 
an important current in the discipline is going in precisely the opposite direction.  
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i Although despite its name, Da Col and Graeber are explicit about the remainder that is left over from the encounter between 
ethnography and theory, citing Eco’s description of translation as ‘almost’ saying the same thing (da Col and Graeber 2011:vii).  
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ii This is despite the existence of large scale comparative anthropological projects. In fact, a part of the methodological impetus 
for this paper came from my current work on an ERC-funded study of European free speech. 
 
iii Miyazaki’s own work, of course, and much of that of Annelise Riles (Riles 2001), takes a significantly more complex view of 
the relationship between anthropological knowledge and its objects, somewhat akin to that for which I argue here. 
 
iv http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/27/weaponizing-the-past 
 
v In a manner akin to what some have called the fallacy of the stolen concept (Rand 1990): ‘property is theft' is an example of 
self-refutation via a stolen concept because the whole notion of theft relies for its meaning on the notion of property. As an 
axiom it depends for its truth on a premise the validity of which it denies. If there is some irony in an axiom about theft being 
accused of stealing a concept, then there is also in the case of the recursive turn, because the stolen concept in this case is the 
whole notion of the conceptual itself. 
 
vi This might also allow for what Richard Handler has called “destructive analysis” – the critical examination of the categories of 
both the analyst and subject of analysis (Handler 1985), particularly when the two resemble one another in the first place. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me towards this idea. Handler’s argument, together with that of Jean-Klein and 
Riles (2005), also makes clear the fact that even in situations in which ethnographic objects – such as nationalist conceptions of 
bounded cultures, or human-rights discourses – appear initially isomorphic with anthropological concepts, it is the task of the 
anthropologist to make difference between the two. Another perspective would be one which Adam Reed has suggested to 
me: that of employing a transitive concept, such as inspiration, in thinking about the relationship between ethnographic 
materials and analytical claims. This seems to me a most promising alternative to recursivity, as it substantially qualifies claims 
about the kinds of effects on anthropological arguments that ethnography can have (though I am also curious as to whether the 
‘meta-inspiration’ for the idea comes from his work on literary societies).  
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